The Art of Rhetoric

What makes a man a 'sophist' is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. (1355b 17)

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove. [4]

[...] e coloro che sono innamorati hanno sempre piacere sia a parlare dell'oggetto amato, sia a disegnarlo, sia a comporre qualcosa: ricordandosene infatti con tutti questi mezzi, ritengono quasi di avvertire la presenza dell'amato. E questa è per tutti l'origine dell'amore, quando non solo si prova piacere nella presenza dell'amato, ma anche quando, ricordandosi di lui quando non c'è, si aggiunge il dolore per il fatto che sia assente.

All that is done on compulsion is bitterness to the soul.

Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever.

But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with moral purpose,are both called rhetoricians; but in Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty. Let

Further, the orator should be able to prove opposites, as in logical arguments;

Dialectic as a whole, or of one of its parts, to consider every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of rhetorical argument,

means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is. Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us;

rhetoric was to be surveyed from the standpoint of philosophy.

How can a man who, for a significant phase of his formation, shared his master’s opposition to rhetoric have in maturity composed a masterpiece of the formal study of rhetoric? This

It was at this point that the transition was first made to the conception that rhetoric was a teachable skill, that it could, usually in return for a fee, be passed from one skilled performer on to others, who might thereby achieve successes in their practical life that would otherwise have eluded them.

The peculiar circumstances arising out of the fall of the Syracusan tyranny seem to have produced the first practitioners of the art of rhetorical

the fact that it took the rise of democracies and otherwise open societies at Athens and elsewhere to create the climate in which public eloquence became a political indispensability.

To say this, however, is not to claim that it was the object of theoretical study.

If there are two definitive features of ancient Greek civilization, they are loquacity and competition.

Bad men, who are to weak for toil, are in love with death

The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker’s character;

For instance, it is not the function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be properly treated.

It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of persuasion.

However, it is not the same with the subject matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade.

not that we should do both （for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong）, but that the real state of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them.

even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction, but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible; our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, as we said in the Topics, when speaking of converse with the multitude.

Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible.

wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard to probabilities. It

since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme,

The present work is, then, the masterpiece of one particular literary genre that flourished in the fourth century BC in Greece, that of the rhetorical manual, and it is a remarkable fact that it should have fallen to Aristotle to write it. It

Let us now turn to their circumstances and their victims. People do wrong, then, when they think that the deed can be done, and can be done by them — which is to say that they think either† (a) they can get away with it, or (b) that if they are caught they will avoid punishment, or (c) that if they are punished the penalty paid by themselves or those they care for will be less than their profits.