Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry

Although these firms deploy units that are often much smaller in manpower relative to their client’s adversaries, their effectiveness lies not in their size, but in their comprehensive training, experience, and overall skill at battlefield judgment, all in fundamentally short supply in the chaotic battlefields of the last decade.14 Utilizing coordinated movement and intelligent application of firepower, their strength is their ability to arrive at the right place at the right moment. The fundamental reality of modern warfare is that in many cases such small tactical units can achieve strategic goals.

The firm’s employees play active roles alongside those of the client, but in a way designed to make the overall combination more effective. Typically, their employees provide either specialized capabilities too cost-prohibitive for the local force to develop on its own (such as flying advanced fighter jets or operating artillery control systems), or they may be distributed across the forces of the client, in order to provide general leadership and experience to a greater number of individual units.

If we do operate in civil wars, we are there as ‘advisers’ or ‘trainers.’ But, of course we are on the frontline, and the excuse is so that we can see if our training is working.

In an interesting attempt at avoiding any possible external prosecution for mercenary activities, the contract stipulated that Sandline personnel be deputized “special constables,” sworn in as PNG police officers, but given military rank. This provision meant that although they were not Papua New Guinea citizens, they would nevertheless have the legal authority to carry weapons, arrest local citizens, and act forcibly in “self defense” (to be interpreted by the firm itself).

Finally, the continuing war in Colombia offers a glimpse of the postmodern network scenario, where all sides in the conflict have linked up with privatized military help. While the government and multinational corporations have hired PMFs, the opposition as well has contracted out much of its intelligence and military functions. Flush with resources, Colombian political insurgents, drug cartels, international mafias, hired advisors, and other affiliates have also made their own alliances. Thus, they are able to limit the exposure of their core, while making use of the latest technology.

The ability to transform money rapidly into force returns the international system to the dangers of lowered costs of war.31 A new international market of private military services means that economic power is now more threatening.

EO promoted itself as providing five key services to clients: strategic and tactical military advisory services; an array of sophisticated military training packages in land, sea, and air warfare; peacekeeping or “persuasion” services; advice to armed forces on weapons selection and acquisition; and paramilitary services.

EO soon realized that it had discovered a growth industry. Word of mouth spread about its effectiveness and, by 1991, the firm had started running operations outside of South Africa. These initial efforts included: mine security efforts; infiltrating and penetrating organized crime smuggling syndicates; and operations for a South American government (rumored to be Colombia), conducting clandestine counter drug raids that it termed “discretionary warfare.

Surprise long-range helicopter assault operations against targets deep within enemy territory, supported by the ground attack aircraft, became a hallmark of EO operations, as did the use of pinpoint suppressive fire with mortars and follow-up pursuit of ambushes.